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Anwar SadatAbstract Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was toppled in the Islamic Revolution of
1979. A year later he passed away from lymphoma, a disease he had secretly battled for several
years, but still it remains unknown exactly when he was diagnosed with cancer, if he was aware
of his condition and who close to him knew about his illness. Following his 1979 exile from Iran,
physicians from numerous countries became involved in his treatment, which was typified by polit-
ical and medical intrigues, contributing to a suboptimal and dangerous medical care which may ulti-
mately have contributed to his death. After acute surgery of his spleen in June 1980, the Shah’s
condition worsened and he eventually passed away on July 27. This study shows that the interna-
tional intelligence organizations were probably aware of the Shah’s disease, and that the Shah was
not cared for in accordance with good medical practice.
 2015 The Authors. Alexandria University Faculty of Medicine. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
2. The spleen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
3. All the secrecy – A matter of national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
4. Did the Shah know? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5. The bitter taste of exile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
5.1. No siesta in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
5.2. The reluctant journey to the states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.3. Another journey to Latin America, Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.4. Back to the land of the pharaohs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20646 46
202 A. Khoshnood, A. Khoshnood6. The king’s death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Conflict of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Acknowledgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2071. Introduction
In 1980, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi died of
cancer, and only nine months after, the medical correspondent
of the New York Times, Dr. Altman1 wrote: ‘‘Even today. . .
some of the physicians who were intimately involved in the
case still debate several critical points in the Shah’s medical
care.” 30 years after the Shah’s death, this debate is still ongo-
ing. Unfortunately, few books and articles have been written
that discuss the Shah in light of his health and the chaos that
surrounded it. Some of them even contain false or incomplete
information: for example, that the Shah had been treated at
the Mayo Clinic2 or that the State Department had no real
information about the Shah’s condition.3 Only the British
journalist William Shawcross4 and the late Dr. Leon Morgen-
stern5 have earlier given detailed accounts of the Shah’s dis-
ease; hence, there is still a knowledge gap regarding the
Shah’s health care and the political aspects of it.
Considering the growing interest in the person of the Shah,
not least in Iran and among the youth,6,7 there is a need for amal-
gamating all available information and accounts to reveal
details, not only of the Shah’s health, but also the political ques-
tions surrounding it. Through a review of relevant literature, we
here present an account of what happened to the Shah, from
diagnosis to his death. An invaluable source for this article has
been the letters of Professor Georges Flandrin to his teacher,
Professor Jean Bernard, published in the memoirs of Queen
Farah Pahlavi.8 These letters document in detail, Flandrin’s
many clandestine visits to Iran, and the condition of the Shah’s
health.2. The spleen
In discussing the onset and time for diagnosis of the Shah’s dis-
ease, one school of thought deems that the Shah developed
symptoms and was diagnosed in 1973/4,4,5,8–13 while another
considers that it was earlier.14–16 The most detailed information
about the Shah’s symptoms was probably recorded by the
Shah’s former Minister of Court, Asadollah Alam, who kept a
diary of all of their meetings. On noticing a swelling in the left
upper abdomen on April 9, 1974, the Shah called upon his per-
sonal physician, Dr. Ayadi who diagnosed the Shah with a sple-
nomegaly. After examination, Ayadi asked Alam to call upon
the French hematologist, Professor Jean Bernard. Alam con-
tacted Professor Safavian, who would later join the Shah’s med-
ical team, who took contact with Bernard whom he knew from
his time in Paris as a medical student and later as a physician.17
With Bernard not available, the Shah decided to wait until his
annual checkup in Vienna by Professor Fellinger.9 The diary
mentions nothing about a possible earlier diagnosis or symp-
toms beforeApril 9, which is curious, since theQueenwrites that
the Shah had symptoms in the autumn of 1973.8Later, in April,11 the Shah met Fellinger, and, according to
the historian Andrew Cooper,18 the Shah was informed that he
had lymphoma. Alam had kept in contact with Bernard who,
on May 1, 1974, left France for Tehran together with Professor
Georges Flandrin. They met Safavian at the airport who
showed them to the Hilton Hotel and then left. There, they
were informed by Alam that their patient was the Shah.
According to Safavian,17 but contradicted by Flandrin8 and
other literature reviewed,4,5,10 also the renowned French physi-
cian, Professor Milliez was present. Until the Shah’s departure
from Iran in January 1979, he would meet Flandrin a total of
39 times, 35 of them in Iran. During this first visit, the Shah
was examined and diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leuke-
mia. Ayadi insisted that this information must not be revealed
to the Shah, a request respected by his French counterparts.
Several blood samples were taken back to France, which
showed the presence of a so-called monoclonal immunoglobu-
lin M peak, characteristic of Waldenstro¨m’s disease. Being an
indolent lymphoma, it was the perfect diagnosis to give the
Shah; one in accordance with Ayadi’s wish to avoid using
the term cancer.4,8,10 With the samples analyzed, the physi-
cians decided to merely supervise the Shah, without providing
any specific treatment.
On September 9, 1974, however, the Shah again com-
plained of splenomegaly.9 Accompanied by Bernard and Mil-
liez, Flandrin arrived in Tehran on September 18, 1974, and
started to treat the Shah with 6 mg of the chemotherapy med-
icine Chlorambucil.8 In order to keep the procedure a secret,
the medication was brought to the Shah disguised in contain-
ers of the harmless anti-malaria medication Quinercil.10 For
unknown reasons, however, the Shah was only treated for
one week. Flandrin confirms this without going into any speci-
fic details.8 Despite the Shah’s condition being deemed to be so
serious on this second visit that pharmacological treatment
was started, a medical report received by the Shah on October
14, 1974 stated that he is in good health.9 This report raises
several vital questions which remain unanswered: who was this
report from? What exactly was stated in the report? How could
the report state that the Shah was in a good health, when he
had started chemotherapy the previous month? Or alterna-
tively, was he in a good health even though he was on
chemotherapy? Safavian17 states that the Shah was not aware
of his cancer until the late 70s. To keep the disease a secret
from the Shah was a decision made by his physicians in order
not to affect the Shah’s ruling of the country; thus, this report
may have been altered in order to give the Shah the impression
that he is in a good health.
The third time the French physicians met the Shah was in
Zurich, on January 18, 1975. The Shah still had a splenome-
galy; consequently, the dosage of the Chlorambucil was
increased, and soon the Shah’s blood count was normalized,
the monoclonal M peak had disappeared and the spleen had
gone back to normal.5,8 In his next visit during February
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abnormal blood count, making the physicians disturbed and
worried. It was then revealed that the Shah’s valet, having
no idea that the containers labeled Quinercil, were in fact
Chlorambucil, had ordered the wrong medication, and as a
result the Shah used Quinercil for a period, explaining why
his condition had worsened. In April 1976 treatment with
Chlorambucil recommenced, and five months later the Shah’s
blood count was normalized.8
3. All the secrecy – A matter of national security
The Shah’s health was kept a well-guarded secret, and consid-
ered a matter of national security. This was, however, quite a
challenge, and even today it is unclear exactly who knew about
the Shah’s disease. According to Flandrin, only seven people
were initially aware of the Shah’s condition: Flandrin himself,
Bernard, Ayadi, Alam, Milliez, Safavian, who had been
included after Flandrin’s second visit, and the Shah.8 Further-
more, because of the secrecy, the examination of the Shah, as
well as any analysis of his blood samples, could not be con-
ducted in a hospital. Therefore, the Shah’s private office at
the Niavaran palace was used as a clinic. The Shah’s disease
was also kept a secret from both the Queen, who was first
informed by the French physicians in spring of 1977 without
the Shah‘s knowledge,8 and the Shah’s twin sister, Princess
Ashraf, who was informed while in exile.19 To further keep
the secret intact, the word Chlorambucil was substituted with
Quinercil in the Shah’s medical journals.8
All this secrecy goes beyond just the Shah, since it directly
also affected, among others, the Shah‘s physicians. Dr. Flan-
drin, who met the Shah over 30 times in Tehran, would, each
time, secretly fly from his St. Louis Hospital in Paris to Teh-
ran, not only withholding the information from his friends
and colleagues, but also his own spouse. Every time, Flandrin,
alone or with colleagues, would stay in a house in the Shemi-
ran quarter in the northern part of Tehran, not leaving the
house, except to visit the Shah, as it could jeopardize the
secret.8
Several publications assert that the international intelli-
gence community had no information about the Shah’s dis-
ease; otherwise they would react differently to the turmoil in
Iran.10,13,20,21 CIA officer William Daugherty13 believes, in
conjunction with official document,20 that no American offi-
cials had information about the Shah’s illness, writing that,
in the Shah’s meetings with the former CIA director and US
ambassador to Tehran, Richard Helms, the Shah always
insisted on his good health. The claim by Daugherty is, how-
ever, contradicted by Andrew Cooper,18 who states that
Richard Helms was well aware of the Shah’s cancer, telling
his senior embassy staff that the Shah was being treated by
French physicians and had written his will. Cooper18 also
observes that, in the summer of 1975, diplomats had been
aware of rumors of the Shah’s ill health. Babak Ganji,22 a spe-
cialist in Middle Eastern politics, asserts that the Shah’s health
was well-known to both the CIA and US officials. Charles
Cogan, former head of the CIA’s Near East and South Asia
Division, claims that French intelligence knew about the
Shah’s cancer as early as 1972,16 and that US officials had
become aware of this in 1976 since, and according to David
Long from the State Department, US officials werewell-informed about the Shah’s condition.14 Professor Zonis23
writes that British intelligence was being informed regarding
the Shah’s cancer since 1974. Whatever the truth, there were
enough rumors to make the New York Times,24 in September
1975, publish an article on the Shah’s health because of ‘‘. . .
persistent rumors in Tehran’s diplomatic community that the
reason the Shah sometimes appears drawn, worn and thin is
that he is suffering from a lingering and increasingly grave
malady.” Safavian17 contradicts this stating that the Shah
was always feeling well, never complaining, and that was the
reason for why he never understood he had cancer.
The Iranian scholar, Abbas Milani, interviewed the former
Iranian ambassador to the US, Ardeshir Zahedi, who claims
that there was a possibility that the Americans intercepted con-
fidential telegrams sent between the Iranian embassy in Wash-
ington and Tehran. Zahedi recollects how an American official
had asked him about the Shah’s physical and mental health,
which was indeed noticeable since, as Milani writes, there were
no discussions in Iran or the West about the Shah’s disease.21
It is consequently unclear if and how much the interna-
tional intelligence community knew about the Shah‘s cancer.
However, because of the cold war and the important role Iran
and the Shah had in that era as an ally of the West standing
against Soviet expansion, all the above would be enough to
make the international intelligence community more than
interested and curious in the health of the Shah, thus increas-
ing their activities in order to understand the extent of the
Shah’s potential disease. It is thus difficult, with respect to
the above, to state that the international intelligence commu-
nity were fully blinded for the fact that the Shah’s health
was not optimal, and were probably aware of the Shah’s
disease.
4. Did the Shah know?
One of the most important and controversial questions is
exactly how much the Shah himself knew about his illness.
There are indications that the Shah did not know about the
magnitude of his illness, though, in contrast, others believe
that the Shah did indeed know that he had a life-threatening
condition.
Morgenstern5 asserts that the Shah was not aware of the
seriousness of his disease until several years after being diag-
nosed in 1974. The word cancer was never uttered to the Shah
himself. Alam’s diary confirms the picture that the Shah may
have been unaware of his condition. In his diary entry for July
9, 1977, Alam writes that the Shah’s splenomegaly had gone
into remission and now was ‘‘cured”. The Shah, surprised,
had asked Alam what went wrong in the first place and if it
was malaria that had caused his splenomegaly. Alam
responded that this is not the case, and that his tablets were
deliberately marked as a medication against malaria ‘‘. . . so
that nobody would realize what was really the matter.”9
Alam’s writing creates some conflicting speculation; if the
Shah was still, in 1977, unaware of why his spleen would be
swollen, it suggests that the Shah did not know anything about
his cancer. On the other hand, given that Alam informed the
Shah that the tablets were disguised in order that no one
deduce what the issue really was, then the Shah must have been
aware of what ‘‘the matter” really concerned. Alam did, how-
ever, tell the Shah that his splenomegaly was perhaps because
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Shah may have known nothing about any kind of cancer. A
closer analysis of the tone in which the conversation has been
written also gives the impression that the Shah may have not
even known that he had some kind of serious disease.
Safavian17 in his first interview about the Shah’s disease, in
July 2015, states firmly that the Shah’s disease was kept a
secret from the Shah until 1978 when Bernad and Milliez were
going to inform the Shah about his cancer. They, however,
never told the Shah since he already had understood, accord-
ing to Safavian. This statement by Safavian is confirmed by
Flandrin who, however, mentions nothing about Milliez. Flan-
drin states, in reference to a meeting with the Shah where they
planned to tell him bluntly that he had cancer, that there is no
doubt the Shah ‘‘understood what we wanted to tell him”, but
eventually withheld the truth. Flandrin bases his assumption
on a comment by the Shah in the mentioned meeting, saying
that he only asked the physicians to help him maintain his
health for only two years so that the Crown Prince, Reza,
would finish his studies in the US and spend a year in Tehran.8
The Shah had, in a remark to Alam in Kish after feeling his
swollen spleen, also said that the modernizing of Kish must go
faster so that it can be finished under his lifetime.9 Queen Farah
considers this issue. She writes that, after his first symptoms in
the spring of 1973, the Shah, four days before his birthday, on
the October 22, 1973, had gathered, among others, the Prime
Minister, Dr. Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, and the commanders of
the armed forces in order to deliver to them his political testa-
ment. The Queen emphasizes that the Shah just had learned
he was suffering from Waldenstro¨m’s disease.
After the incident with the Shah’s splenomegaly in April
1974, the Shah included both the Queen and the Crown Prince
in the affairs of the country to a greater degree, conferring with
the PrimeMinister, among others about the state of the country
several times each week.8 The Shah was clearly preparing both
the Queen and the Crown Prince, who were still too young to
ascend the throne, to be ready to take over the ruling of the
country. The Shah had in 1966 made the Queen, then only
28 years old, regent. This act of the Shah, placing a woman in
power in a Muslim country, was, in itself, quite revolutionary.
Only one year after his swollen spleen-incident in Kish, the
Shah had, according to the Queen told French President Gis-
card d’Estaing that he would not be in power in Iran for much
longer.8 All this would suggest that the Shah, if not aware of his
cancer, at least knew he was suffering from a serious condition.
Since the Shah, after the April 9, 1974 incident started to
talk about not being around for long and almost immediately
began to engage the Queen and the Crown Prince in matters of
state, it may be because he, in reality, had been diagnosed with
a blood disease before April 9, 1974, with the splenomegaly
making him understand the condition had now worsened.
The fact that Alam’s diaries show some confusion may be
because Alam himself did not know any details about the
Shah’s health, or that the issue was so sensitive that he did
not even write about it in the diary. In discussing this matter
one can only speculate.
5. The bitter taste of exile
After a year of violent demonstrations in Iran, and his refusal
to use military force against the demonstrators, the Shah leftthe country on Tuesday January 16, 1979 for Aswan,
Egypt.5,8,10 The Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, a long-
standing friend of the Shah, met the royal couple at the air-
port, escorting them to the Oberoi Hotel on the Nile. Four
days later, Flandrin was summoned, but only a routine phys-
ical examination was performed. On January 22, 1979, the
royal couple set off for Morocco; first to the Janan Al-Kabir
palace in Marrakesh, and then to Rabat and the Dar es Sal-
aam palace. Flandrin visited the Shah twice, though unfortu-
nately there is no specific information about his visits.8 The
Shah’s stay in Morocco soon started to cause problems for
King Hassan, who himself was under heavy attack from
domestic Islamists. That fact alone, compelled the royal couple
to leave on March 30 for the Bahamas, and Nassau. Shortly
after arrival, the Shah found a lymph node above his clavicle,
which, after aspiration by Flandrin,8 showed large cell lym-
phoma. Chlorambucil proved to be ineffective so a treatment
with Vincristine, Procarbazine, Nitrogen mustard and Pred-
nisone was implemented.4,5
5.1. No siesta in Mexico
For unknown reasons, the Bahamian government decided not
to renew the royal couple’s visas, and they accordingly left the
Bahamas for Cuernavaca, Mexico, on June 10, 1979. The
Shah’s chemotherapy dosage was raised, but he developed a
fever and jaundice. The Mexican doctors, not knowing about
the Shah’s cancer, diagnosed the Shah with hepatitis and
malaria, though this was soon ruled out and the Shah instead
diagnosed with an obstructive jaundice.5
Probably because of the Shah’s worsening condition, one of
his advisers, Mark Morse, contacted another of the Shah’s
advisers in New York, Robert Armao, who sent Dr. Benjamin
Kean, a specialist in Tropical medicine, to Mexico for further
investigation. Both Morse and Armao were aiding the Shah on
behalf of David Rockefeller, a longstanding friend of the Shah.
While in New York, Kean, was told there was a problem with
Peter Smith. Years earlier, Kean had been treating the Swedish
banker, Marcus Wallenberg, under the pseudonym Peter
Smith. By hearing this name again, Kean understood that his
future patient should be an important figure, and thus sur-
rounded by secrecy.4
Kean left New York for Mexico, but the Shah would only
listen to his French physicians. Kean, feeling insulted, left, but
was soon summoned back to Cuernavaca, where he met Flan-
drin and was informed about the Shah’s cancer disease. Flan-
drin was, however, surprised by Kean’s presence, stating that
he did not need a specialist in tropical medicine.8
While Kean insisted the Shah should be moved to the New
York Hospital, Flandrin felt that the hospitals in Mexico
would be good enough to treat the Shah and discussed the
issue with Dr. Garcia, the head of a Mexico City hospital
ready to treat the Shah.8 The Shah himself had agreed to being
treated in a hospital, but would not go to the US, he stated:
‘‘How could I go to a place [USA] that had undone me?
Increasingly, I began to believe that the United States had
played a major role in doing just that.”12 Additionally, also
the Queen preferred a hospital in Mexico over seeking medical
care in the US.8 The Shah had even asked Flandrin and one of
the royal couple’s most loyal friends in exile, Dr. Pirnia, a pedi-
atrist, to search for a good Mexican hospital. Soon after, a
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repeatedly advised against this, stating that an American hos-
pital would be better. According to Princess Ashraf, Mexican
physicians conveyed to the Shah that he should seek care in
the US.19 The Shah wrote that, if he had continued to stay
in Mexico, special isotopes would have to be flown from Hous-
ton on a regular basis for his treatment.12
Rockefeller’s adviser, Joseph Reed, without the Shah’s
knowledge, contacted David Newsome, Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs at the State Department, to discuss
the Shah’s need for medical care in the US. The State Depart-
ment sent their medical director, Dr. Eben Dustin, to Cuer-
navaca, who confirmed that the Shah has a malignant
lymphoma and that Mexico lacked the necessary equipment
and specialist care to manage the Shah’s medical needs.10
The newly formed Islamic Republic, in contrast, believed the
Shah’s illness to be exaggerated and wanted to send their
own physicians to examine him, which was, of course,
declined.21,25
5.2. The reluctant journey to the states
Eventually, the American team prevailed, and the decision to
allow the Shah into the US for medical care was taken, on
October 20, 1979, by Jimmy Carter after concerted pressure
from Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger.26,27 Two days later
the royal couple departed for the US.
The Shah was admitted to the New York Hospital’s 17
floor under the pseudonym David Newsome, causing the real
David Newsome, mentioned above, considerable frustration.
At the New York Hospital, the Shah met Chief Physician
Dr. Hibbard Williams and Dr. Morton Coleman, an oncolo-
gist. A computed tomography was performed, which showed
splenomegaly and gallstones obstructing the bile duct, which
explained the Shah’s jaundice. Surgeon Dr. Bjo¨rn Thorb-
jarnarson28 performed a cholecystectomy, later receiving a
great deal of criticism due to the fact that the Shah’s spleen
was not removed during the surgery.4 The Queen8 writes in
her memoirs that she would later discover this surgery to have
been carried out ‘‘clumsily” and that ‘‘. . . an anonymous
patient was better cared for than someone known.” One of
the main problems with this surgery was that it was planned
without any prior discussion with Coleman. The surgery was
performed on the October 24 with a cholecystectomy and exci-
sion of a cervical lymph node. Additionally, several gallstones
were removed. When the surgery was underway, Coleman was
informed and asked Thorbjarnarson to also remove the spleen,
but Thorbjarnarson did not feel right performing an elective
surgery while performing an urgent cholecystectomy.28
Even though the surgery went well, the following choledo-
choscopy showed a gallstone in the left hepatic duct. Thorb-
jarnarson states that he was not sure whether this stone had
been removed, but repeated scoping and X-rays did not show
any remaining stones.28 After the cholecystectomy, the Shah
issued a statement about his health for the first time, informing
the public about his lymphoma.12
In late November, the Shah complained of right upper
quadrant pain, cholangitis and high fever. A cholangiogram
showed a stone on the top of the T-tube. Dr. Joachim Burh-
enne, a respected radiologist, was contacted by Thorbjarnar-
son, and, on the November 29, removed the Shah’s gallstonethrough a non-operative method he had devised himself.5,28
Flandrin was furious with the whole farcical situation sur-
rounding the surgery, and stated: ‘‘Amazement, disbelief,
and even hilarity went through the medical world. . . It was
not the best that American medicine could offer, but the worst,
as can be find in any country in the world. It really was
appalling.”8
The histopathology of the removed cervical node showed
malignant lymphoma, and the Shah was diagnosed with histi-
ocytic lymphosarcoma, now called large cell lymphoma.5
Radiation therapy of the cervical node was, after their initial
denial of treatment for security reasons, started at the Memo-
rial Sloan Kettering Medical Centre.5 Ironically, years earlier,
the Shah had donated 1 million dollars to Sloan Kettering,
where the Queen Mother had been operated upon.11 At last
the management capitulated and the first of the Shah’s ten
radiation treatments began on November 9 by Chief Radiation
Therapist, Dr. Florence Chu. As the radiation therapy came to
an end on the November 27, Kean asked Coleman to leave
because of a dispute, the nature of which is still not yet
known.4
5.3. Another journey to Latin America, Panama
On December 2, 1979, the Shah left New York for Lackland
Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. Once again he was
shown to have a splenomegaly, and new blood tests were taken
under the pseudonym Raul Palacios, which showed a deterio-
ration of his hematologic status. Kean and Williams were sum-
moned,4,5 and asked for an urgent splenectomy. The Carter
administration, in the hope of getting the American hostages
in Iran free, was, however, keen on having the Shah leave.
Therefore, the Shah declined further surgery in the US. After
13 days at the Lackland Air Force Base, the royal couple
was moved to Howard Air Force Base, now known as Panama
Pacific International Airport, and, from there, to Contadora
Island in Panama, where they would stay at a house owned
by the American ambassador, Ambler Moss. The security
was coordinated by the soon-to-be infamous Colonel Manuel
Noriega.5
The Panamanian president, General Torrijos, appointed his
own physician, Dr. Carlos Garcia, to manage the Shah’s med-
ical care. In February 1980 the Shah’s cancer flared up and
once again Flandrin was summoned, although Armao and
Keane tried to stop him.8,12 As Flandrin arrived at the Ken-
nedy Airport to depart for Panama, he was called over by
the information desk. Robert Armao was on the phone, asking
to meet him, whereupon Flandrin was informed he is no longer
needed in Panama. Flandrin also met Kean, who made it clear
that he was the Shah’s personal physician and that Flandrin’s
services were not welcome. Flandrin states: ‘‘But I was deter-
mined to go; I had been naı¨ve and ingenuous, but not any-
more.” Flandrin went against the will of Armao and Kean,
and left the US for Panama that same afternoon. He would
stay in Panama for one month, and while there, he was put
in contact with Dr. Adan Rios, a US graduate oncologist, in
whom Flandrin found trust.8
A blood test was performed, demonstrating pancytopenia.
Flandrin’s foremost concern, however, was the urgent need
for a splenectomy. In order to take care of the ‘‘hematological
intensive care” before and during the operation, Rios, through
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hemapheresis, the medical discipline of gathering blood ele-
ments for therapeutic purposes, who joined the Shah on
March 6.8,29 Flandrin also informed Kean, who traveled to
Contadora together with Williams.
Flandrin wanted a splenectomy to be performed as soon as
possible. Kean, in contrast, was opposed to any surgery, but
eventually capitulated. However, a new conflict erupted. Flan-
drin and Garcia wanted the splenectomy to be performed at
the Paitilla Clinic in Panama City, while Kean wanted Dr.
Michael DeBakey, a cardiothoracic surgeon, to perform the
surgery at the Gorgas Hospital, then a U.S. Army hospital
in Panama City. Flandrin had little information about DeBa-
key, and accordingly had no opinion, but Hester and Rios
were firmly opposed, stating DeBakey was no surgeon of the
abdomen.8,10 Kean prevailed, but Garcia, himself a part-
owner of the Paitilla Clinic, insisted the surgery to be per-
formed there, and made it clear that anything else would be
unacceptable.12 To further complicate the case, Thorbjarnar-
son states that he was contacted by Kean in early 1980 and
asked whether he would travel to Mexico to perform the
Shah’s splenectomy. Thorbjarnarson did, however, not hear
anything further from Kean about this issue.28
On March 14 the Shah was admitted. Even before the sur-
gery commenced, they faced a problem in the lack of blood
available for Hester to prepare. The surgery was on the verge
of being postponed, when volunteers at the Gorgas Hospital
donated blood.4 At the hospital the Panamanian physicians
denied DeBakey the chance to operate, having been insulted
through being overlooked for the surgery themselves. As a
result DeBakey left the country. The surgery was consequently
postponed. The Shah had now become less eager regarding
having his surgery there, concerned that if he stayed he might
be killed by the Islamic regime in Iran. While in Panama, the
Islamic regime demanded the Shah to be extradited,25 and,
in a meeting between Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff to Pres-
ident Carter, and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh,a a close aide to Khome-
ini and Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic, the latter
asked Jordan if the CIA would kill the Shah while in
Panama.30 The First Lady of Egypt, Jehan Sadat, wondered
if Khomeini would go so far as to have the Shah killed on
the operating table.31 Consequently, on the March 23, 1980,
without surgery, the royal couple left Panama and returned
to Egypt.
5.4. Back to the land of the pharaohs
The Shah and his entourage arrived at Cairo the same day, and
he was admitted to the second floor of the Al-Maadi Military
Hospital. President Sadat’s personal physician, Dr. Taha
Abdel Aziz, a cardiologist, already had a team available. Flan-
drin also joined, but was surprised to hear that DeBakey and
his team, as well as Kean and Williams, were also invited,
though it is unclear by whom. Suddenly, not only were five
physicians responsible for the Shah’s life, but they also dis-
agreed on almost every single issue concerning his health.
Flandrin had, nevertheless, some advantage in that he was able
to form a good relationship with Abdel Aziz, and was a gooda Ironically, Ghotbzadeh himself was in 1982 executed by Khomeini,
on allegations of espionage.friend with the Egyptian hematologist Dr. Amin Afifi, Presi-
dent Sadat’s son-in-law.
Three days after the Shah’s arrival in Cairo, DeBakey and
his six-member team arrived, and, on the March 28, 1980, at
8 pm, the Shah’s splenectomy began. The spleen weighed close
to 2000 g and was riddled with tumorous nodules; thus, a liver
biopsy was taken, which later showed signs of multiple metas-
tases.8 According to DeBakey, the surgery was successful,32
and later events, however, would prove just the opposite.
Three days after the surgery the Shah complained of low pos-
terior left thoracic pain, making Flandrin and the Egyptian
surgeon Dr. Fouad Nour, suspect a subphrenic abscess, which
DeBakey’s Australian assistant dismissed.8
The Shah started chemotherapy after ten days, and, after
two weeks, he was discharged to Koubbeh Palace, the resi-
dence of the royal family. By the end of April his condition
deteriorated and an X-ray showed pleural effusion.5 The
Queen contacted Flandrin by phone who suggested that, since
the Shah may have a subphrenic abscess, DeBakey must return
to Cairo in order to re-examine him. It is unclear whether the
Queen contacted DeBakey himself, but she states that those
around him insisted that the Shah had a case of pneumonia.8
The Shah’s condition worsened, and because of this deteriora-
tion, chaos erupted: Princess Ashraf contacted Coleman who
came to Cairo along with Dr. Thomas Jones. The Queen also
called Flandrin, who had barely arrived in France, back again.
The Egyptian physicians now had the main responsibility, yet
once again DeBakey returned.4,5,11 This melting pot of physi-
cians resulted in chaos. Flandrin kept insisting that Shah was
developing a subphrenic abscess, Coleman believed that the
Shah’s symptoms were due to salmonellosis and DeBakey, to
Flandrins surprise, insisted that the Shahs deterioration is
because of the chemotherapy, the dosage of which he
reduced.5,8
In early June the Queen called Flandrin once more. The
Shah was having difficulties due to respiratory infections and
the Egyptians were in need of a pulmonologist, so Flandrin
brought with him the pulmonologist Dr. Herve´ Sors, after a
consultation with the world-renown pulmonologist Professor
Phillipe Even. They both diagnosed the Shah with a sub-
phrenic abscess. Coleman was also present in Cairo, and once
again a conflict with Flandrin emerged; this time on how to
treat the Shah’s lymphoma.5 The conflicts escalated, and by
now even the Queen and Princess Ashraf were in deep dis-
agreement over how the Shah should be treated. In this time
of despair, President Sadat took leadership and confirmed
Flandrin as the Shah’s personal physician and the one in
whom the final decisions rested.5 Flandrin contacted the
renowned French surgeon, Dr. Pierre-Louis Fagniez, who
immediately traveled to Cairo. On June 30, the Shah was once
again under the knife. Flandrin states: ‘‘Using Fagniez’s tech-
nique, he had made a limited left subcostal incision to proceed
directly to where the pus had collected. . . . Fagniez and the
Egyptian surgeons were all beaming. They were in the process
of draining a liter and a half of pus and necrosed pancreas
debris.”8
Morgenstern, himself a renowned surgeon, states that the
time between the surgery and the drainage was too long.5
Almost immediately after the surgery, Al-Ahram, the most
widely circulated Egyptian newspaper, reported that the
Shah’s pancreas was injured during the splenectomy.4 It was
Nour who witnessed that he had seen that tail of the pancreas
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splenic hilum by finding pancreatic tissue.8 DeBakey and his
assistant present at the surgery, Dr. Gerald Lawrie, denied
any injuries to the pancreas and stated that no drainage was
necessary.4,5 Morgenstern,5 however, states: ‘‘In retrospect, it
does seem likely that some pancreatic leakage initiated the pro-
cess that led to the subphrenic abscess.”6. The king’s death
On the night of July 26, 1980, the Shah’s condition deterio-
rated and he slipped into a coma. Flandrin and Fagniez diag-
nosed a massive internal hemorrhage and resuscitation was
started. It was Ramadan; consequently, the Egyptian physi-
cians had left to break their fast. They were all called back.
The Queen was in chock, and wanted Flandrin to make a call
to Alexandria in order to let their children know about the
Shah’s deterioration and return to Cairo. The Shah received
eleven units of blood and regained consciousness. For a few
hours he could talk with his family and friends. At 9.45 am
on the morning on July 27, 1980, the Shah finally lost his long
battle with cancer. The Queen8 states: ‘‘The king breathed
quickly twice, then drew in a long breath and stopped. It
was over.” From under the Shah’s pillow the Queen withdrew
a little bag containing soil from Iran, the country he had
reigned over for 37 years. President Sadat himself took charge
of the state funeral ceremony and declared a state of public
mourning. Two days later, July 29, 1980, the Shah had a state
funeral and was brought to his temporary resting place.
In accordance with Islamic tradition, the Shah’s closest
friend, also his former foreign minister and son-in-law, Arde-
shir Zahedi, washed the Shah’s body before it was placed in
a coffin decorated with the Iranian flag. The cortege with the
Shah’s body left the Abdin Palace for the Al-Rifa’I mosque
accompanied by the Pahlavi royal family, President Sadat,
President Nixon, King Constantine and Queen Anne-Marie
of Greece, Prince Victor Emmanuel of Savoy, the Ambas-
sadors of the US, West Germany and France, First Ambas-
sador of Israel and Charge´ d’affaires of Britain. The only
Arab country attending, Morocco, sent one of King Hassan
II’s relatives, Moullay Hafid Aloui.
The funeral ceremony was, without doubt remarkable.
Egypt’s First Lady, Jehan Sadat,31 describes it as follows:
‘‘No state funeral was grander. Anwar organized it all himself,
overseeing even the smallest details. . . .There were more flow-
ers than anyone had ever imagined. It was the most spectacular
funeral that any of us in Egypt ever had seen, and the last
chance to show the world that the Shah deserved better than
the way he had been treated. Egypt at least, had not turned
her back on a friend.”
The Shah’s death put an end to an important era in the his-
tory of Iran. His death was also one of the most shameful
debacles of the history of medicine. Morgenstern5 states: ‘‘It
was not a proud moment in world history, medical history,
or the history of surgery.” Safavian17 states that the Shah
could have lived for 10 more years if politics had not taken
over his medical needs and care.
The Shah’s care was infected with political interference,
medical misdiagnosis, careerism, confusions and conflicts.
Even the Shah’s medical records had been leaked and shown
to representatives of the Islamic Republic by Kurt Waldheim,then Secretary General of the United Nations, without any
respect for one of the most sacred tenets of medicine, the
doctor-patient confidentiality.25
7. Conclusion
This review demonstrates that it is still unclear exactly when
the Shah developed his first symptoms and when he was diag-
nosed with cancer. It is also unclear how much the Shah him-
self knew about his disease although this review gives some
indications that he was aware he had a fatal disease. We
believe that his disease was, to some extent, likely known by
the international intelligence community and foreign officials.
In consideration of the Shah’s medical care, it lacked qualified
physicians at the right time. Had he been treated in accordance
with good medical practice, he could have lived longer and per-
haps even played a role in the future of Iran. Thorbjarnarson28
states: ‘‘Some years later I was attending a conference in Ham-
burg, Germany. As my wife and I finished dinner one night, I
found our table surrounded by a group of severely dressed
men; the identification on their lapels said they were from
the Islamic Republic of Iran. They wanted to know whether
the Shah really had cancer. I reassured them that he had histi-
ocytic lymphoma. They thanked me for the information. I
think I heard one in the group say ‘he was the only one that
could have saved us.’”
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